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i Abstract 
There is much talk of the knowledge economy, and the central role of 
ideas and knowledge in generating economic growth. This paper provides a brief 
review of the economic literature on how skills/ knowledge/ ideas might 
contribute to higher output or higher rates of growth. Ideas are complementary 
inputs into production, in the sense that they raise the productivity of other inputs. 
Some of the complementarities may give rise to externalities—effects that do not 
have to be paid for. For investments in ideas to generate output growth, these 
complementarities must be particularly strong. I conclude with some comments 
on what policy makers can draw from the literature, which is some encouragement 
but little specific guidance. 
 
JEL classification 
E10—General aggregative models—General  
O40—Economic growth and aggregate productivity—General 
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ii 1 Introduction 
There is much talk of the knowledge economy, and the central role of 
ideas and knowledge in generating economic growth. There may even be some 
substance behind some of the claims. There are certainly many stories and 
theories about how such a link may operate. In fact, there are so many different 
stories that one might be seduced into uncritical acceptance of the general point, 
even if no single story has been proven. The lack of discrimination between 
different mechanisms may result in a view that "more is better"—running the risk 
of having too much investment in ideas, or of investing in the wrong sorts of 
ideas. 
Of course, if we can identify investments that raise the growth rate 
rather than just the level of economic activity, the implied return on those 
investments would make them very attractive. Who would not spend a little extra 
today to generate exponentially higher living standards for future generations? 
The existence of a number of relatively recent reviews of human capital 
and growth
1 is evidence of a keen interest in the issue, within both the economics 
and policy communities. At the risk of glossing over the distinct contributions of 
the various papers, the general impression that one gains is that the theoretical 
approaches to modelling links between human capital and growth have managed 
to find convenient functional forms to generate a positive relationship, but that the 
empirical evidence is circumstantial, contentious, or both. There is more than a 
hint of scepticism about some of the empirical findings, even among those who 
argue for the existence of a link. 
This paper contains a non-exhaustive summary of issues relevant to the 
discussion of human capital and growth, focusing primarily on insights and 
evidence from economics. My intention is to provide a non-technical discussion 
that is accessible to policy advisers, highlighting some of the key analytical 
distinctions. 
                                                           
1 I have found the papers by Rebelo (1998), Gemmell (1999), Topel (1999), Sianesi and van 
Reenen (2000), Temple (2001), Dowrick (2003), and Romer (1994) helpful. 
1 I use the terms “human capital”, “ideas” and “knowledge” 
interchangeably, and somewhat loosely. Education is a commonly used empirical 
proxy because it is more readily observed and measured than are ideas, knowledge 
and human capital. Some writers use the term human capital to mean only 
investments in skills or knowledge that are embodied in an individual. This 
restriction blurs when we admit the possibility of spillovers (unpriced positive 
side-effects), or if we accept that human capital investment consists of ideas and 
knowledge. In essence, I regard any form of learned knowledge, skill, ideas, or 
education that can generate a stream of future benefits for an individual as human 
capital. 
My discussion starts with a brief account of how ideas can raise the 
level of output. I then consider the forms and implications of externalities arising 
from ideas, and finally comment on what is required for investments in human 
capital to generate a sustained increase in growth rates. In general, it seems that 
there are too many stories chasing too few facts. 
2  Ideas and the level of output 
A key question in the discussion of the links between human capital and 
growth is whether a higher level of aggregate human capital raises the level of 
income, or whether it can generate sustained increases in the growth rate. 
Ideas are a productive input to production. Human capital theory 
formalises this statement by modelling decisions about investment in ideas, and 
the consequent flow of benefits. For individuals, countless Mincerian
2 wage 
equations show a positive relationship between earnings and human capital 
investments (in the form of schooling and experience).
3
                                                           
2 The naming reflects Jacob Mincer’s pioneering work in the empirical analysis of human capital 
models. See Mincer (1974). 
3 There is still, however, considerable debate about the exact size of this effect, and on the best 
way to obtain unbiased estimates of it. See, for instance, the discussion of education returns in 
Card (1999). For New Zealand studies on the return to education and qualifications, see Maani 
(1999), Maani (2000), Gibson (2000), Dixon (1996), and Dixon (1998). 
2 For firms, there are positive returns to investments in new ideas, in the 
form of research and development (R&D) expenditures. It is therefore highly 
likely that, at an aggregate level, an increase in the level of education or R&D will 
yield a higher level of income.
4
In a standard human capital model, there are limits to how much 
investment is desirable. A combination of rising marginal costs and/ or 
diminishing marginal returns means that beyond some “optimal” level of human 
capital, the costs of further investment outweigh the rewards to that investment.
5
We can apply standard production theory to model the way that human 
capital interacts with other productive inputs. The presence of a greater amount of 
a complementary input raises the marginal product of human capital. For instance, 
skilled labour and capital are complements, meaning that skilled labour is more 
productive when combined with capital inputs. Similarly, research and 
development expenditures are more productive when combined with skilled 
labour or capital. 
If such complementarities are sufficiently strong, knowledge and other 
inputs could grow together, without any decline (or rise!) in marginal returns. 
Formally, this condition is captured with the assumption of constant returns to 
scale. Doubling all inputs doubles output.
6
In the standard Swan-Solow neoclassical growth model, aggregate 
production is modelled as a function of capital and labour. Furthermore, capital is 
the only factor that can be accumulated, so capital investments are the only 
accumulation decision that is endogenous (determined within the model). 
                                                           
4 It is possible that, at very high levels of education, the costs of additional educational investments 
will outweigh the benefits, due to rising marginal costs and/ or declining marginal returns. 
5 For instance, Ben-Porath (1967) obtains the essential features of the model with constant 
marginal returns and rising marginal (opportunity) costs. 
6 Rising marginal costs of investment could put a stop to this growth if investment costs (or the 
productivity of investments) rise with the stock of inputs. In this case the (constant) marginal 
returns will be insufficient to justify continued investment in one or other of the factors. We will 
see in Section 4 how these limits can be overcome (at least for the purpose of economic 
modelling!) by appropriate assumptions. 
3 The accumulation of capital determines the economy's growth 
trajectory towards the unique steady state. Ideas play no part in the standard 
formulation. The number of workers is taken as given, possibly with some 
deterministic growth rate. Any additional growth is treated as “technical change”. 
Investments in education, knowledge and ideas are all subsumed in the technical 
change term. 
Mankiw et al. (1992) added human capital as an additional input to the 
neo-classical growth model, and endogenised investments in human capital as 
well as those in physical capital. The resulting model does a better job than the 
Swan-Solow model of explaining cross-country growth variation, and of 
generating plausible parameters. Their model is still, however, in the neoclassical 
growth model tradition, and consequently maps out a growth path towards a 
unique steady state. Along this growth path, both the capital stock and the human 
capital stock grow—albeit at decreasing rates, due to overall diminishing returns 
to the factors that can be accumulated (physical and human capital). Investments 
in knowledge move the economy closer to the steady state, especially when the 
stock of knowledge is low, but cannot generate sustained increases in growth. As 
such, knowledge accumulation has a level effect only, albeit one that may take 
many years to effect.
7
Once we take account of the fact that human capital is not 
homogeneous, the structure of the level effects can become more complex. For 
instance, low-skilled labour and capital are generally found to be substitutes,
8 
meaning that an increase in one lowers the marginal productivity of the other. 
More generally, we can think of a team of workers contributing different types of 
ideas to the production process, so the return on ideas will depend on what other 
idea inputs are present. Knowing where someone works can explain about the 
same amount of earnings variation as knowing someone’s individual 
characteristics (Abowd and Kramarz (1999)). 
                                                           
7 The structure of the model implies that the growth rate is ever-decreasing, and it would thus take 
an infinite time to reach the steady state! 
8 Hamermesh (1993). 
4 As a general principle, returns are higher when complementary inputs 
are present. In teams, it is usually desirable to have a mix of junior and senior 
team members. At least within some range, an increase in the number of senior 
team members will increase the productivity of the juniors. Similarly, an increase 
in the number of junior members will make the seniors more productive. A similar 
principle suggests that a mix of general and specialist skills may be preferred to a 
homogeneous workforce. At an aggregate level, this is one of the key principles in 
designing immigration policies—immigrants should have a skill mix that is 
different from (and complementary to) that of current residents. 
The range of ways that knowledge can complement other inputs is 
broader than for inputs other than knowledge and ideas. This is true because of 
particular characteristics of knowledge. For a start, knowledge is non-rival. If I tell 
you something I know, I don’t (necessarily!) forget it. Having people around with 
knowledge lowers the cost to others of investing in knowledge. The transfer of 
knowledge between skilled workers was commented on as far back as 1890 
(Marshall (1920)). 
Jacobs (1969) emphasises the process of generating new ideas by 
combining existing knowledge. Interactions between people (especially people 
with high human capital) can generate new ideas that can lead to increased 
productivity. If the expected benefits of such interactions are rewarded directly (as 
would be the case if research team members received salaries that reflected the 
expected value of innovations), such interactions don’t generate externalities. The 
generation of new ideas in this way by increasing the overall stock of human 
capital will offset diminishing marginal products (as will any form of 
complementarity) but will not generate sustained growth (through increasing 
returns) unless it reverses the decline in marginal products. 
5 Investments in research and development are similarly “generative” in 
that they create new ways of doing things or discover new things to do, raising the 
productivity of other workers (and capital). The stock of knowledge arising from 
research and development investments can be included as an input into 
production—one that can be complementary with one or more other factors.
9
High levels of knowledge may also contribute to productivity of other 
factors by promoting the division of labour. Smith (1904) emphasised the 
advantages of specialisation, and noted that the extent of the market limited the 
scope for specialisation. Becker and Murphy (2001) note that costs of 
coordination may also limit specialisation, and move the balance in favour of 
having more generalist skills. Uncertainty about the type of skills and knowledge 
needed for the future would also reduce the attractiveness of specialisation. 
General rather than specialised skills provide a type of risk-pooling against skill 
obsolescence. 
In summary, there is a wide variety of ways that your investments in 
knowledge or ideas can raise the return to my investments. Dowrick (2003, p. 7) 
refers to this as “complementarity of investment” and states that 
“complementarity is probably more pervasive in the accumulation of skills than in 
the accumulation of objects. Indeed such complementarity is an essential 
ingredient in the development of social capital”. In this context, social capital can 
be characterised as a source of complementarity. It lowers the cost of coordinating 
activities (e.g. through shared knowledge or trust), and the costs of investing are 
lowered if social capital can be acquired during almost all interactions with others. 
                                                           
9 Acemoglu (2002) examines (inter alia) the possibility that research and development that is 
complementary with skilled labour might have supported the increase in skill premia in recent 
decades. 
6 3  Level effects with externalities 
("spillovers") 
The existence of complementarities is sometimes (wrongly) used as a 
priori evidence of an externality, and hence as a justification for welfare-
enhancing policy interventions. In some cases, the argument for the existence of 
an externality is reasonable, although it is difficult to isolate external effects from 
other observationally equivalent phenomena such as selection.
10
3.1  Private v social returns 
The discussion in the previous section described complementarity 
mechanisms, but without any mention of whether the effects were internalised. In 
at least some of the cases described, it is feasible that the complementarities are 
reflected in prices. For instance, a firm may hire highly skilled workers in large 
part for the positive effect that they will have on the productivity of other workers 
(e.g. through knowledge transfer). The firm would be willing to pay the skilled 
worker for the marginal effect that they have on firm productivity, in which case 
there would be no externality involved. 
In many cases, it is harder to see how the private returns to an 
individual’s investments in knowledge will be equated with the social returns. For 
instance, if knowledge transfers or ideas generation occur at the level of the city 
(rather than within firms), highly skilled individuals are unlikely to capture the 
full benefits of their contribution. It would be socially beneficial to effect marginal 
increases in knowledge acquisition, as long as the marginal social benefit exceeds 
the marginal social cost of further investment.
11
                                                           
10 For discussions and analyses of knowledge-based external effects, see Lucas (1988), Glaeser et 
al. (1992), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000b, (2000a), Rudd (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Battu 
et al. (2001), Ciccone and Peri (2002), Hoxby (2000), Borjas (1995), and Manski (2000). 
11 Without intervention, marginal private benefits equal marginal private costs and marginal social 
benefits are greater than marginal private benefits. Unless the social marginal cost similarly 
exceeds the private marginal cost, an increase in investment is justified. Of course, the marginal 
social cost may be higher than the marginal private cost. This is more likely if expanding 
knowledge must be financed through distortionary taxes. 
7 Similarly, it would be difficult for individuals to capture the full 
benefits of their impact on peer or neighbourhood effects. Hoxby (2000), 
discussing classroom peer effects, claims that peer effects are “by definition, 
externalities”. One final example is that of research and development investments. 
New discoveries are the platform from which further discoveries are made. The 
ideas are (patents notwithstanding) non-rival. Furthermore, the knowledge occurs 
as “disembodied human capital” (Romer (1990)), meaning that it exists 
permanently and independently of the individuals who created it. 
3.2  Where might spillovers arise? 
It is difficult to make general statements about whether social returns to 
knowledge exceed private returns, since spillovers are difficult to isolate 
empirically. The following section sketches a few (fairly randomly chosen) 
examples of how complementarities and spillovers may arise at different levels of 
aggregation. While clearly related, analyses at the different levels have evolved 
more or less separately, making for a somewhat disjointed set of “accepted 
wisdoms” about where to look for spillovers. 
3.2.1  For individual agents 
Complementarity of different forms of knowledge can occur for 
particular individuals. By definition, the relationships are internalised. Lazear 
(2002) analyses the degree of specialisation in individuals’ skill-sets. People in 
entrepreneurial roles tend to gain a set of complementary skills, whereas 
specialists rely on skill complementarity that occurs between them and others and 
which takes place at the level of the firm or above. Complementarity of skills is 
also evident at the level of the individual if we consider different forms of literacy. 
Chapple and Maré (2000), for instance, find evidence of complementarity 
between three forms of literacy, which is evident in higher wages or employment 
chances. 
8 3.2.2 Classrooms 
There is a well-established literature analysing peer effects that occur in 
school classrooms. This is relevant to the policy/ school design issue of whether to 
stream
12 students by attributes such as ability or gender. Externalities arise if a 
student’s performance depends on class composition.
13 The link to aggregate 
externalities is a bit subtle. As Hoxby (2000) notes, externalities that arise at the 
level of the classroom may not generate an aggregate externality—streaming is a 
zero sum game,
14 unless the relationship between individual and class 
performance is non-linear.
15
3.2.3  Between firms and industries 
A firm’s R&D investments are likely to generate knowledge that is of 
use to other firms in the same line of business. The firm will not, however, capture 
all the benefits of discoveries, and so will under-invest. A similar dynamic applies 
to industry-specific training. High investment in knowledge facilitates 
specialisation—possibly across industries. The benefits of this specialisation will 
thus accrue to firms in industries other than the one in which the specialised 
labour or knowledge is generated, again leading to under-investment.  In any of 
these cases, the “social” return (measured across firms) to investments will be 
greater than the “private” (firm) return.
16
3.2.4  Within locations: Economic geography/urban economics 
There is a good deal of literature attempting to model and estimate the 
extent of knowledge externalities (generally proxied by education) for geographic 
areas, usually the city or state. The general approach is to see if a city-level 
measure of educational attainment has any explanatory power, once individual 
returns have been taken into account. 
                                                           
12 Also referred to as “tracking” in the literature. 
13 There is evidence of such a relationship occurring. See the review in Hoxby (2000). 
14 Positive externalities are exactly balanced by associated negative externalities. Moving a 
positive-externality-generating student from one classroom to another does not change the size of 
the externality—only who benefits from it. 
15 See also Benabou (1996). 
16 Dowrick (2003) reports the findings of studies that show high estimated returns to research and 
development expenditures, as well as even higher returns at the country or cross-country level. 
9 Recent work by Acemoglu (1999) and Ciccone and Peri (2002) finds 
little evidence to support externalities, and concludes that previous positive 
findings were capturing the impact of production complementarities and supply 
changes. 
Localised externalities may also occur for firms. Research and 
development externalities have also been found to be localised. Similarly, clusters 
of firms appear to have higher productivity than they would if they were more 
dispersed. External effects constitute one of the possible explanations. Similar 




If external effects are widespread, we would expect that social rates of 
return would exceed private rates of return. The general approach to estimating 
social rates of return (OECD (1998), Maani (1999)) produces a lower bound on 
social returns, since it excludes any spillover effects of education—the very 
effects that are of greatest interest in the current paper.
18 Studies estimating social 
rates of return in this way usually find rates that are lower than private rates of 
return. Such a finding would be consistent with overinvestment, or with 
educational qualifications being primarily a signalling device. The evidence from 
studies that try to pin down spillovers suggests that there are external effects from 
education, implying that the usual social return estimates are biased downward. 
For instance, the relationship between education and output appears to be higher 
at higher levels of aggregation (e.g. economy-wide as opposed to individual or 
firm-level).
19
                                                           
17 See Henderson (1999) or Krugman (1999). 
18 Estimated social rates of return usually calculate the lifetime internal rate of return on 
educational investments, net of educational expenditures, and before tax. 
19 This inference is my overall judgement from a reading of a literature containing a wide range of 
findings. Many reasonable people would disagree. 
10 4  Growth effects (non-decreasing returns) 
To find a link between growth and human capital, we need to look 
beyond level effects. Modelling investment behaviour provides a first link. 
Intuitively, we can regard human capital as an input into an aggregate production 
function. At low levels of human capital, the marginal return to investment would 
be high. As the level of human capital increases, we would expect the marginal 
return to decline, slowing growth. Investments in other productive inputs (such as 
physical capital) would temper the impact of diminishing returns on human 
capital. 
There is one special case in which investments in human and physical 
capital occur together in a way that overcomes diminishing returns. For human 
capital investments to generate sustained growth, we need a particular form of 
production relationship—one that captures constant (or increasing) returns to scale 
in factors that can be accumulated. In terms of the sort of complementarities that 
have just been discussed, we need these to be strong enough to outweigh 
diminishing returns. As Dowrick (2003) notes, some form of “dynamic feedback” 
is necessary. 
The macroeconomic growth literature has captured these strong 
complementarities in various ways. An early approach was to simply write down a 
production function that captured decreasing returns to capital (which could be 
broadly construed to include human capital—basically anything that could be 
accumulated) at the firm level, but interactions that were powerful enough to 
generate non-decreasing returns at the aggregate level.
20
                                                           
20 The production function can be written as Y = A K
α N
(1-α) (K )
(γ) where K is the aggregate 
stock of capital and α + γ = 1 where there are constant returns to scale. Each firm faces decreasing 
returns to the capital that it can accumulate (K), but returns are increasing overall. 
11 The subsequent endogenous growth literature has examined in more 
detail what might lie behind such interactions, and how such interactions might 
exist in a competitive equilibrium. A number of plausible mechanisms have been 
identified:
21: 
•  Knowledge spillovers within industries (Marshall-Arrow-Romer 
(MAR) knowledge externalities): Knowledge is shared—as the greater 
the shared stock of knowledge, the more productive is any given 
individual’s productivity. 
•  Knowledge spillovers between industries (Jacobs-type innovation 
externalities): Productive new ideas arise as a result of interactions 
between existing ideas. Scale increases the productivity of interactions. 
•  Learning by doing (capital stock spillovers): Capital inputs are more 
productive in the presence of a high stock of “disembodied” human 
capital in the form of technologies. These spillovers may also arise due 
to specialisation of production, which is limited by the extent of the 
market. 
•  Learning by doing (human capital stock spillovers): Human capital is 
more productive in the presence of a high stock of knowledge ( 
“embodied” human capital). These spillovers may also arise due to 
specialisation of knowledge, which is limited by the extent of the 
market. 
•  Learning by doing (product range spillovers): 
-  Expanding variety: Having a larger range of goods lowers the cost 
of developing new products (Romer (1990)). 
-  Quality ladders and patent races: Grossman and Helpman (1991)) 
and Aghion and Howitt (1992)) model the development of new 
goods and the replacement of old ones. Firms have the option of 
improving the quality of old goods. The potential for doing this is 
related to the existing range of goods. 
                                                           
21 Aghion and Howitt (1998) summarises many of the models. Rebelo (1998) also contains a 
useful set of summaries and discussion. Some of the formal models are consistent with more than 
one interpretation. 
12 4.1 Evidence 
The literature tells us about what sort of relationships or mechanisms 
would be needed to generate a relationship between the level of knowledge and 
the growth in output. In particular, there would need to be a high degree of 
complementarity, which can generate non-decreasing returns in the long run. 
There are some formally modelled examples of candidate mechanisms but beyond 
that, the literature is less instructive. 
In particular, there is not much guidance on which are the most 
important or realistic forms of interaction. The theoretical literature has focused 
on formalising types of interactions that might generate the necessary interactions. 
The empirical literature has sought to find (often circumstantial) evidence of such 
interactions, and has so far not been very convincing in isolating the actual 
mechanisms. Even simple estimates of the growth benefits of education are 
“imprecisely measured” (Temple (1999, p. 152)). Cautious reviews of the 
empirical findings in the literature can be found in Temple (2001) and Gemmell 
(1999), both of which also summarise the problems of drawing causal inferences 
from the existing studies. 
5 Policy  choices 
To develop policies that might be able to “correct” allocation problems 
arising from externalities, or to harness the potential that may exist from 
increasing returns, one would ideally want to be fairly specific about the type of 
externality, and where it occurs. This is probably asking too much of the 
literature. Temple, in his review article, notes that: 
“Arcane discussions about the validity of endogenous growth 
theories are likely to frustrate the policymaker in search of 
knowledge that can be put to good use. Those forming policies 
would ideally like to find a set of instructions that is short, clear 
and easy to implement. It is a foolhardy researcher who responds to 
this desire by condensing many books and articles into a one 
paragraph summary, but somebody perhaps ought to try. A quick 
overview of why growth rates differ is a useful way to close. 
13 A key reason why growth rates differ across countries is that 
macroeconomic stability differs across countries. This effect partly 
acts through capital investment, and equipment investment may 
have a special role. As yet the growth benefits of education are 
imprecisely measured.” 
Temple (1999, p. 152) 
A (not uncommon, but often implicit) alternative response to the lack of 
precise prescriptions is to be persuaded by the overall plausibility of the various 
externality arguments, and use either a “shotgun” approach (induce some 
expansion of knowledge investments for a number of plausible types of 
knowledge), or a “blunt instrument” approach of encouraging more investment 
without picking any particular forms of investment. Given the uncertainty about 
the precise mechanisms, these may be sensible approaches. 
5.1  Dimensions of choices for policy designers 
A greater understanding of (or judgements about) which particular 
forms of complementarity or dynamic feedbacks lie behind hypothesised growth 
effects would help policy designers to choose interventions to target the right 
forms of knowledge or ideas. Choices could then be made along a number of 
dimensions. The following three dimensions seem to me to be relevant ones. They 
do not arise directly from the literature(s) discussed above, but are included here 
to help focus questions about the nature of skill interactions and policy. 
Level 
Should interventions be aimed at raising the top end of the knowledge 
distribution or the bottom? Either could conceivably contribute to greater 
specialisation. Knowledge transfers are more likely if the focus is on the top. 
Specificity 
Should general or specific knowledge be encouraged? There are 
benefits of specialisation, but also advantages in having a high level of general 
skills to aid coordination, insure against risky specialisation, and combat limits to 
specialisation that arise due to the extent of the market. 
14 Timing 
Should interventions be targeted earlier or later in life? This decision 
depends on the complementarity between different forms of knowledge and 
learning. How much does a sound basic education lower the costs of subsequent 
learning? Alternatively, are there complementarities between experience and 
learning, or skills obsolescence that would justify lifelong learning? 
5.2  Are level effects good enough? 
The assumptions required to justify a macroeconomic relationship 
between sustained growth and human capital are fairly particular. Finding credible 
evidence of complementarities at various levels seems more realistic. If policy 
were to be targeted at complementarities rather than at growth, it could still 
generate increases in productivity over probably fairly prolonged periods. Temple 
notes that: 
“Either growth is endogenous, or it is exogenous and level effects 
are large. Given the presence of large level effects, distinguishing 
between exogenous and endogenous growth models is not as 
pressing as it might seem. The important point is that policy can 
have a major impact on a country’s level of welfare. As pointed out 
earlier, the debate on whether policy affects the long run growth 
rate or just the steady state level of income is almost impossible to 
resolve, and not much of practical importance will turn on it.” 
Temple (1999, p. 152) 
Policies to pursue aggregate level effects will be even more beneficial if 
their impact is on growth as well as on levels. There is also evidence of ‘wider 
benefits of learning”,
22 which would tend to increase payoffs. 
  Policies to promote clustering, relieve skill shortages, or promote 
investment could be seen as harnessing complementarities and not even 
necessarily targeting any particular form of spillover. For instance, addressing 
current “skill shortages” through training or immigration may be interpreted as 
encouraging investment in inputs that are in relatively short supply and for which 
                                                           
22 See, for instance, http://www.learningbenefits.net/. 
15 the marginal return is therefore great. Increasing the stock of skilled labour would 
raise the productivity of other inputs. 
The average expected benefits of this sort of “blanket” policy approach 
may, however, be small, and must be weighed against the possibility that loosely 
targeted policies may impose significant costs. For instance, even though skilled 
labour and capital are, on average, complements, encouraging the wrong sort of 
skilled labour may be ineffective in raising the productivity of other inputs. It will 
nevertheless be costly, and will reduce the resources that are available for stronger 
sources of complementarity benefits. Similarly, raising skills across the entire 
workforce may be a very costly way to generate level or growth effects if these 
arise for only a small subset of skills. 
As always, it is possible to have too much of a good thing. Unless there 
really are non-decreasing returns to knowledge investments (which seems unlikely 
except over a possibly small range at low levels of knowledge), rising marginal 
costs of investment will mean that there are limits to how much can be achieved 
without imposing unjustified costs on other parts of the economy. 
Policy makers and their advisers searching for ways to stimulate growth 
(whether sustained or not) can find some encouragement but little specific 
guidance in the literature reviewed here. Judgements will still need to be made 
about which forms of complementarity or spillover are most likely to have 
positive impacts, and about the scale and scope of any proposed intervention. 
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